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REGULATORY TECHNIQUES IN CONSUMER PROTECTION:
A CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER CONTRACT LAW
Oren Bar‐Gill and Omri Ben‐Shahar

Abstract
This Article classifies the consumer protection techniques that
European contract law employs into four categories: Mandatory
arrangements; disclosure; regulation of entry to and exit from
contracts; and pro‐buyer default rules and contract interpretation. It
argues that these techniques are far less likely to succeed than
advocates, including the European Commission, believe, and that they
may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers. The
techniques and their limits are illustrated through a study of the
proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). The Article argues
that the ambitious pursuit of consumer protection goals is also likely
to interfere with the other main goals of European contract law:
harmonizing the laws of member states, encouraging cross border
trade, and improving consumers’ access to markets.
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Introduction
The Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL)1 incorporates four of the
most important consumer protection techniques that have been widely used in
European Contract Law. Unfortunately, these techniques’ superficial appeal does not
withstand economic logic. This article argues that European Contract Law in
general, and the CESL in particular, are far less likely to succeed in protecting
consumers than lawmakers and commentators believe, and that the techniques they
commonly employ may bring about unintended consequences and hurt consumers,
and will likely undermine the other main objective of European private law—
harmonization and cross border trade.
The four consumer protection techniques commonly employed in European
contract law are (1) mandatory pro‐consumer arrangements, which must be part of
every consumer contract; (2) mandated disclosure; (3) regulation of entry to and
withdrawal from contracts; and (4) pro‐consumer default rules and contract
interpretation. Each of these techniques is utilized extensively and repeatedly in the
CESL, but all originate from prior enactments.
The first technique—mandatory pro‐consumer arrangements—is perhaps
the most phenomenal device. This technique has been proliferating over the past
decades in European consumer law, but has reach acme in the CESL. Eighty‐one (!)
provisions in the CESL are mandatory: sellers cannot write contracts that derogate
from these arrangements to the detriment of consumers. The mandatory provisions

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on a Common European Sales Law, Annex I: Common European Sales Law (hereinafter we
refer to Annex I as “CESL” and to the entire Regulation as “Regulation”).
1
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involve remedies, withdrawal rights, risk of loss, warranties, notices and
communications, disclosure rules, and more. Sellers, for example, do not have the
right to cure nonconforming performance, and buyers have a non‐disclaimable right
to reject nonconforming goods for 2 years! Many terms that are otherwise common
in sales contracts, freely drafted by sellers, are prohibited.
We argue that many of these superficially protective rules are unlikely to
help consumers as a group. The ex post pro‐consumer arrangements will be priced
ex‐ante. Consumers will thus pay for protections that many of them would rather
waive for a discount. This price effect is particularly disturbing when it is
regressive—namely, when all consumers pay for what only the more sophisticated
ones enjoy. Ironically, a wholesale inclusion of mandatory terms undermines, rather
than promotes, “social justice” concerns, which intend to protect weaker consumers
and secure their access to the markets.2 More fundamentally, we argue that many of
the mandatory arrangement lack an a‐priori welfare‐enhancing justification,
because they are not responding to some systematic market failure or to a
systematic redistributive problem.
The second common technique that is proliferating in European contract law
is, unsurprisingly, mandated disclosure. This is a standard staple of consumer
protection: give people information to help them make better autonomous choices.
“Sunlight is the best of disinfectants,” as the truism goes. Unfortunately, the types of
disclosures that consumers are accorded, nicely illustrated by the CESL’s mandates,
are likely futile. These disclosures fail to inform consumers. They are neither read
H.‐W. Micklitz, Introduction, in: THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW 37 (2011).
2
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nor used, and they are beyond most people’s care or understanding. While novel
approaches to “targeted” disclosure are being experimented with elsewhere
(including, e.g., in the U.K.), the conventional European disclosure paradigm
reproduces archaic templates that have consistently and irreparably failed.
The third technique is the regulation of entry to, and withdrawal from,
consumer contracts. These rules are intended to promote freedom from contract:
help consumers avoid obligations that are otherwise the result of “passive”
contracting. Entry regulations help consumers make deliberate, conscious choices,
tailored for their needs. Withdrawal regulations help them correct poor choices
without bearing any pecuniary fine. Here, too, various European laws take a
sensible starting point but leverage it to an extent that is unjustified and is likely to
be either ineffective or harmful. The regulation of conscious entry is merely another
form of disclosure, likely to be as ineffective as other mandated disclosures. And the
regulation of withdrawal through broad scope, extensive duration, mandatory terms
applies a practice that is already prevailing in markets and imposes it in contexts
where it might hurt, rather than help, consumers.
The fourth and final regulatory technique is the supplementation of
incomplete contracts with pro‐consumer default arrangements. We find in Europe
less use of this device relative to the U.S. for the simple reason that many
arrangements that operate as gap‐fillers in the U.S. are accorded mandatory status
in Europe. But, interestingly, in the CESL for example, the few pro‐consumer default
rules are bolstered by “stickiness.” Parties can opt out, but the procedure for these
opt‐outs is more rigorous and costly. While sticky default options are a growing
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trend in consumer protection law—a strategy designed to slow down wholesale
boilerplate opt‐outs—we argue that opt‐out regulation in the form adopted in the
CESL is unlikely to generate any benefit, and may impose unnecessary cost. A
related technique, directing courts to interpret ambiguous contract terms in pro‐
consumer fashion, is also likely to increase transactions costs without providing
substantial benefits.
In sum, we argue that the major regulatory techniques, implemented by the
CESL as well as in many European contract law enactments, are unlikely to achieve
their consumer protection goal. The next four sections examine each of the four
methods in more detail. We do not take issue with the substantive content of any of
the rules. Looking at particular rules and rethinking their justification is beyond the
scope of this article. Rather, we focus on the methods by which protective interests
are promoted—mandatory rules, disclosure, exit and entry, default plans—and
evaluate the likely effects of these methods vis‐à‐vis their objectives.
The fifth and final section explores the implications of our critique to the
prospect of harmonization. The inefficiencies we identify with the substance of the
consumer law make any optional instrument that employs such protections, and
specifically the CESL, less attractive as governing law. The question – a question that
needs to be asked and answered separately in the context of each member state – is
whether the optional instrument is better or worse than the national law. We
predict that any optional instrument like the CESL that contains a myriad of costly
consumer protection techniques will be chosen, by sellers, only in member states
that have more restrictive national laws. There, it might have a beneficial effect. But
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it will not achieve harmonization. A full analysis of these issues would require
detailed pairwise comparisons between the CESL and the national laws of each
member state. Such comparisons are beyond the scope of this article.

I. Mandatory Arrangements
A. The Law
Much legislation in the past several decades has created a web of mandatory
arrangements that limit freedom of contract in consumer transactions. Since
member states vary in the scope of such legislation and in their choices to go beyond
the benchmarks imposed by the European Union’s Directives, we will focus on the
set of mandatory rules proposed by the CESL, which reflect the direction that many
local jurisdictions have already taken. The analysis we offer is general, however, and
is not restricted to the CESL. In fact, we will pay little attention to the substance of
the proposed mandates, and comment instead on the generic merits, and limits, of
the technique.
The CESL was designed to provide consumers a high level of protection, and
it features many pro‐consumer arrangements concerning substantive contractual
rights, remedies, formalities, formation procedures, disclosures, warranties, and
interpretation. It could have done what many other sales statutes do, and establish
these arrangements as default rules, allowing willing parties to opt out of them by
express agreement.3 But anticipating that such default‐rules would likely result in
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See, e.g., UCC § 1‐302; U.K., The Sales of Goods Act of 1979 § 55(1).
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standard form opt‐outs and disclaimers, the CESL safeguards its consumer
protections by according them mandatory, non‐disclaimable, status.
In keeping with existing trends, the CESL includes a dizzying array of
mandatory arrangements—provisions that cannot be excluded and can only be
modified to favor consumers. In 31 different places, the following sentence appears:
“The parties may not, to the detriment of the consumer, exclude the
application of this Article [or Section, or Chapter] or derogate from or
vary its effects.”4
In all, we counted 81 of the statute’s articles which are bestowed a mandatory
status. All of the buyer’s remedies are mandatory, as are the withdrawal rights, the
disclosure rules, the interpretation rules (more on disclosure and interpretation in
parts II and IV below), the restitution rules, the risk of loss provisions, some of the
implied and express warranties, limitations on sellers’ right to cure, rules relating to
notices and communications, interest for late payments, grace periods, all the
prescription rules, and much more.5
For example, consumers have a non‐disclaimable right to choose between
repair and replacement. A seller must give the consumer a 30‐day mandatory grace
period if the consumer is delayed in performance. Take‐or‐pay clauses are
forbidden altogether in consumer contracts, and, strikingly, the seller does not have

CESL Arts. 2, 10, 22, 27, 28, 29, 47, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 81, 92, 99, 101, 102, 105,
108, 135, 142, 148, 150, 158, 167, 171, 177, 186. In some of the Articles, the sentence
quoted in the text appears with slight variations. In a handful of Articles, the phrase “to the
detriment of the consumer” does not appear.
5 CESL Arts. 2, 10 [¶¶ 3‐4]; Ch. 2, Sec. 1 (10 articles); Ch. 2, Sec. 3 (4 articles); Arts. 28, 29;
Ch. 4 (8 articles); Arts. 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75 [¶ 2], 77; Ch. 8 (8 articles); Arts. 92 [¶ 2], 99
[¶ 3], 101, 102, 105; Ch. 11 (17 articles); Arts. 135, 142, 148 [¶ 2], 150 [¶ 2], 158, 167; Ch.
16, Sec. 3 (4 articles); Ch. 17 (6 articles); Art. 186.
4
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a right to cure defective performance, while the buyer has up to two years(!) from
the time she learned of the defect to reject delivery and terminate the contract.6
In addition, the CESL bans a long list of terms by establishing that they are
always unfair. These include some of the most common choice of forum terms, such
as mandatory arbitration or seller’s home court.7 They also include “asymmetric”
arrangements, for example when the consumer is bound but the seller is not, or
notice periods that are more lenient to the seller, or remedies that are more
forgiving to the seller.
Some terms are banned more “softly” by presuming them to be unfair (the
presumption is not conclusive). These are some of the most common provisions one
would otherwise find: limits to buyers’ remedies, one‐sided termination rights,
sweeping modification clauses, assignment terms, large advance payments,
restrictions on seeking supplies or repairs from third parties, bundling separate
goods and services, or setting a contract’s duration to exceed one year.
In this cornucopia of mandatory protections, it is important to remember
which elements of the contract are not mandatory. The “main subject matter of the
contract” and the price are excluded from the unfairness tests, and are binding even
if set unilaterally by the seller.8 Surely, subjecting quality and price to mandatory
restrictions would deal a fatal blow to any notion of freedom of contract, and even
the most ambitious statutes honor the parties’ freedom to agree on any quality and
price, even if such agreements reflect harsh bargaining realities.
See CESL Art. 106, ¶ 3(b); Art. 111, ¶ 1; Art. 135, ¶¶ 1‐2; Art. 155, ¶ 3; Art. 106, ¶ 3; Art.
84(j); Art. 179.
7 See CESL, Article 84(d).
8 See CESL, Article 80(2).
6
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B. Discussion
It is tempting to think that a pro‐consumer mandatory regime would benefit
consumers. All else equal, consumers are better off with more favorable provisions.
But all else is not equal. Consumer protection comes at a price. Pro‐consumer terms
that actually constrain and change sellers’ behavior raise sellers’ costs, and sellers
will pass‐on (at least some of) these increased costs to consumers in the form of
higher prices.9 Recall, the CESL preserves freedom of contract with respect to price.
Of course, higher prices are not inherently bad. Consumers may prefer high‐
quality products with a high level of consumer protection, even if these high‐quality,
protection‐intensive products cost more. But consumers might also prefer to pay a
lower price and get lower quality products with a lower level of consumer
protection. People often waive warranty programs, buy non‐refundable items,
choose slower delivery option, or decline to insure, because it makes the product
cheaper. A 30‐day grace period, or a generous remedy, or an easy no‐questions‐
asked termination option, are surely beneficial to consumers, but they are also
costly to sellers, resulting in higher prices. If most consumers prefer these perks,
sellers would offer them and lure consumers with them. The fact that they do not—
and the fact that the law needs to mandate them—suggests that most consumers
prefer the discount (assuming that consumers are sufficiently sophisticated).
The preceding discussion lumps all consumers together, asking whether
consumers as a group would benefit from strong protections once these protections
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1998); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of
Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer‐Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361
(1991).
9
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are priced. But consumers are a heterogeneous group, with different preferences
and different budgets. Indeed, heterogeneity of consumers is one of the important
premises of the harmonization project, aiming “to grant access justice to those who
are excluded from the market or to those who face difficulties in making use of the
market freedoms. European private law rules have to make sure that the weaker
parties have and maintain access to the market.”10 The protections secured by the
CESL or by even more ambitious member states’ laws are intended to benefit
consumers who are otherwise mistreated, denied service, or left without access.
Unfortunately, the perspective we offer suggests that the proposed protections
would undermine, rather than secure, access justice. While some consumers may
prefer to pay high prices for strong protections, others may prefer the low‐price‐
low‐protection combo. Among this latter group are some consumers who would be
priced out of the high‐protection market. When consumers are heterogeneous, a
one‐size‐fits‐all mandatory approach necessarily hurts certain subgroups of
consumers. Metaphorically, some air travelers prefer to fly first class, even at the
higher airfare. But most consumers would protest if airlines were required, by
notion of equal access, to fly all passengers in first class. This is precisely why many
people reject extended warranty programs offered by retailers. They don’t want to
buy better terms.11

Micklitz, supra note 2, at 5. See also Chantal Mak, In Defense of CESL (this volume).
See Tao Chen, Ajay Kalra, & Baohong Sun, Why Do Consumers Buy Extended Service
Contracts?, 36 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 611, 615 (2009) (only 1/3 of consumers
purchase extended warranties); Glenn B. Ross & Irfan Ahmed, Extended Warranties: A
Behavioral Perspective, 19 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 879, 879 (1992) (30‐50%
estimates).
10
11
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The focus, thus far, has been on heterogeneity with respect to the price‐
protection tradeoff. Consumers are also heterogeneous with respect to their
propensity to benefit from protections. Some consumers are more like to inspect
goods and return them, to invoke warranties, to demand replacements, or to sue
and seek damages. For them, the right to sue the seller in court rather than
arbitration, or the right to obtain strong remedies for breach, is more valuable. To
others—often the “silent majority” who are not aware of their legal rights and
protections—the enhanced access to court and remedies is less beneficial. They do
not complain, do not sue, or reach an “off‐contract” understanding with the seller—
and de facto waive the protections. For example, the Eurobarometer survey, cited
and relied on by the Commission in proposing the CESL, shows that consumers
report a preference for arbitration over litigation.12 Since sellers are generally
unable to segregate, in advance, the more vs. less litigious consumers, all consumers
will pay the price of the protections that only the few enjoy.13 This is a cross‐subsidy
from the majority to the few (and not from sellers to buyers).
This cross‐subsidy is often inefficient: the cost to the many is greater than the
benefit to the few. It is also regressive and unfair. To benefit from the legal
protections, consumers need to be informed about these rights, to have the
sophistication to insist on compliance, and to afford legal advice.14 The wealthier

See William H. Hubbard (this volume).
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679; Gwen D.
Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross‐Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (1988).
14 Hubbard, supra note __. Studies show a disproportionate advantage to the wealthy in
learning about pecuniary benefits through mandated disclosure. See, e.g., Barbara O’Neill et
al., Money 2000 Participants: Who Are They?, 37 J. Extension 6 (1999); Kimberly Gartner and
12
13
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and healthier consumers are systematically more likely to invoke the protections.
The poor, the elderly, the less educated—those for whom the protections are
enacted in the first place—lack the information, the sophistication, and the
resources. And yet, they bear an equal share of the cost. Thus, mandating such a long
list of protections is likely to diminish the access to markets for those who already
face the greatest barriers.
Mandatory rules are not bad by definition. They could be utilized efficiently
when voluntary contracts cannot be relied upon to maximize social welfare—for
example, when contracts impose externalities, or when one of the parties is unable
to make good decisions.15 Consumers may fail to make good decisions either
because of asymmetric information or because of imperfect rationality (and often
the combination of the two). A rational, informed consumer would selectively
bargain for the protections that are worth the added price. Less sophisticated
consumers might not fair so well in a laissez‐faire environment. They might fail to
appreciate certain risks or powers, and so they might underestimate the importance
of certain protections. When sophisticated sellers face such naive consumers, the
market equilibrium may include an inefficiently low level of consumer protection.16
This concern may justify an occasional protection, but it hardly justifies the CESL’s

Richard M. Todd, Effectiveness of Online “Early Intervention” Financial Education for Credit
Cardholders (July 2005).
15 See, generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate over Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV 1395 (1989).
16 See Oren Bar‐Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER
MARKETS (Oxford University Press, 2012).
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wholesale inventory of mandates, which are often based on exaggerated ex‐post
concerns rather than any systematic notion of market failure.17
II. Information and Disclosure
A. The Law
The regulation of information is arguably the most common technique in
consumer protection law. Based on the irrefutable logic that informed decision
makers reach better, safer, and more efficient decisions—consumer protection
statutes rely plentifully on two devices that deliver information to consumers. First,
they mandate various affirmative disclosures, requiring informed parties to convey
certain information, often in mandated formats, to all consumers. Second, they
supervise voluntary disclosures to assure their integrity, with causes of action
against deception and fraud.
The CESL, for example, applies both techniques. Like any sales statute, it
forbids deception. Since merchants lure consumers by representations that are at
times rosier than the subsequent performance, consumers are entitled to rely on the
information given, and the representations are enforceable notwithstanding

There is a different, potential justification for a uniform sales law that is basically
mandatory. In a large market like the EU consumers need to consider and compare different
products, offered by different sellers, from different countries, at different prices, and with
different governing legal‐contractual regimes. It may be beneficial to simplify this
multidimensional decision problem by fixing one aspect – the legal‐contractual regime. Still,
this potential justification needs to be weighed against the substantial costs of the
mandatory rules. And, moreover, the optional nature of the CESL undermines this potential
justification.

17
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attempts to disclaim then in the standard form.18 This is the “basis of the bargain”
principle of warranty law.19
More ambitious is the CESL’s approach to mandated disclosure. First,
consumer contracts have to explicitly disclose a variety of terms, ranging from the
most basic (e.g, price, fees, payment and delivery, duration) to the more specialized
(e.g., conditions for termination, post‐sale services, digital rights limitations, right to
withdraw).20 Second, the CESL mandates a “duty of transparency,” which is achieved
in several ways. Boilerplate terms have to be communicated “in plain intelligible
language.”21 Many of them have to be in writing.22 And drafters have “the duty to
raise awareness” to terms that are particularly important—“a mere reference to
them in the contract document” is not sufficient.23 A separate and specific
acknowledgement of assent is required, to ensure that the information reaches its
destination. Thus, the consumer must receive not only the standard form contract in
a durable medium, but also a separate disclosure regarding the right to withdraw
and its limitations (as well as a standardized withdrawal form).24
Third, and most innovative, the very fact that the CESL is chosen as the
governing law has to be disclosed and explained. Since consumers are oblivious to
lawyerly matters like choice of law, the CESL pursues a formidable mission: “The

CESL, Articles 28, 69.
UCC § 2‐313. See Douglas Baird, Precontractual Disclosure Duties under the Common
European Sales Law (this volume).
20 CESL, Articles 13 ‐ 18, 20, 22, 27.
21 CESL, Article 82, Articles 13(3)(b), 13(4)(b).
22 See, e.g., CESL, Article 18 (for off‐premise contracts).
23 CESL, Article 70.
24 CESL, Articles 17(4), 19(5), 41(3). The form that the disclosure must take is mandated in
Appendixes 1 and 2.
18
19
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use of the Common European Sales Law should be an informed choice” and so
consumers “must be fully aware of the fact that they are agreeing to the use of rules
which are different from those of their pre‐existing national law.”25 The CESL
requires merchants to use a uniform Standard Information Notice—a two‐page pre‐
drafted form—that consumers must receive in writing, separate from the
merchant’s standard form contract, highlighting the law’s “salient features”.26
B. Discussion
The CESL’s anti‐deception rules are quite standard, adopting familiar
safeguards for the integrity of voluntary disclosures. Markets that rely on voluntary
communications, advertisements, and promises must penalize fraud—for the
benefit of both consumers and honest merchants, and to enable credible sorting
along quality and price dimensions. We are more critical of the CESL’s other
information device: its approach to mandatory disclosure. The disclosure paradigm
adopted by the CESL is archaic and likely futile. It mandates formats of disclosure
that have failed in the past, that are highly unlikely to deliver any benefit, and are
more likely to impose unnecessary costs, and even have unintended harms.
The CESL’s contract disclosures are likely to fail because consumers will not
pay attention to them. People do not pay attention to standard forms, neither long
nor short, in plain language or in legalese, written or oral, separately signed or
unified into one document, handed out in advance or ex post. The failure of
consumers to attend to mandated disclosures packaged in pre‐drafted language has

25
26

Regulation, Preamble, Sections 22‐23.
Regulation, Articles 8‐ 9 and ANNEX II.

14

been documented thoroughly, in area after area of consumer transactions, medical
“informed consent,” privacy, financial literacy, and much more.27
Many factors account for this “non‐readership” phenomenon. First, the CESL
alone requires a hefty amount of disclosures, far too time consuming for shoppers to
investigate in the course of routine sale transactions. The typical consumer would
take home a “packet”: the standard terms of the contract, the right‐to‐withdraw
disclosure, the actual withdrawal form and the Standard Information Notice. The
packet may actually be much heftier, because lawmakers regulate sector‐specific
disclosures to alert consumers to particular features, risks, costs, and options,
unique to some products. In the U.S. for example, there are sector‐specific disclosure
mandates for sales of cars, appliances, food, drugs, timeshares, prepaid charge cards,
burial products, art, pets—and many, many, more. If these sale transactions involve
credit, or service elements, or insurance, or implicate privacy issues, or
environmental issues, or conflicts of interests, additional disclosures are mandated.
In this clutter, how likely are consumers to read any of the CESL’s pre‐printed
boilerplate? And the fact that people might get the CESL’s packet monotonically, in
repeated opportunities, might only render it invisible, regarded as another robotic
routine—not as a vital information source.
The problems with disclosure as a consumer protection device run deeper,
and this is not the place to analyze their roots. Disclosure mandates are often
written without regard for people’s cognitive abilities and literacy levels. They
disregard people’s reluctance to read texts that are unfamiliar and imposing. They
See, generally, Omri Ben‐Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 647 (2011).
27
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misconstrue people’s objectives, thinking of consumers as guzzlers of technical
information, not as users of products. They tell people stuff about matters that most
people have no experience with, which require a theoretical framework to analyze.
People do not read the disclosures because good things will rarely emerge from this
exercise. It is time‐consuming, dull, largely irrelevant, and full of bad news. Any dash
of vitality that brought them to the transaction in the first place would be quashed.
Besides, if they read something they dislike, would they switch to another merchant
with its own set of disclosures?
This kind of mandated disclosure could be costly and harmful. It is costly
because it compounds the transactions costs with extra forms, signatures, clicks,
and much ceremony. It is harmful because it creates a presumption of “informed
consent” that weakens the effect of other protections. When a term is disclosed, it is
no longer “hidden.” If courts are willing to strike hidden one‐sided terms, they might
hold back if consumers are presumed to be fully aware. For example, “written
disclosure requirements, without other protections, can have the unintended effect
of insulating predatory lenders where fraud or deception may have occurred.”28
This does not imply that disclosure, as a regulatory tool, can never work. If
mandated disclosure is to help consumers, at the very least a new approach must be
adopted – one very different from the more‐information‐is‐better paradigm that the
CESL implements. Effective information tools come in two general forms:

28 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. & U.S. Dep’t of Treasure, Recommendation to Curb Predatory
Home Mortgage Lending 67 (2000); See also Robert A. Hilllman, Online Boilerplate: Would
Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e‐Standard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE (Omri Ben‐
Shahar ed., 2007).
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(1)

Very simple, aggregate metrics that consumers can easily understand

and compare, like total cost of ownership or satisfaction ratings.
(2)

Information that is designed and aimed to facilitate the work of

sophisticated intermediaries.
Of course, the proper place for such “new paradigm” disclosures is not in a
general sales law like the CESL, but rather in market specific laws and regulations.
III. Regulating Entry and Withdrawal: Freedom from Contract
A. The Law
The regulation of entry into contract and withdrawal from it intend to help
consumers choose the deals they want and allow consumers to correct poor choices
hastily made. With greater freedom from contract, merchants are less able to afflict
consumers with unwanted products and hidden burdens.
The CESL rules require an active, conscious choice by consumers in order to
enter into the contract. In an era of standard form contracting characterized by
consumer passivity, the CESL envisions entry into a contract that is more active and
deliberate on the consumer side. First, sellers must obtain explicit consent to
various aspects, including the use of the CESL, “separate from the statement
indicating the agreement to conclude a contract.”29 Second, the seller must provide
the consumer with a “confirmation of that agreement on a durable medium.” 30 In
practice, consumers will likely have to sign two forms – the contract and the consent

29
30

Regulation, Article 8.
Id.
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to use the CESL. In addition, specific confirmatory memoranda and
acknowledgments are required for distant and electronic contracts.31
Under the CESL consumers enjoy a right to withdraw from distance and off‐
premises contracts, within a 14‐day period, at no cost to the consumer.32 The
rationale for the right to withdraw is that consumers need to inspect and try out the
product before deciding. Assent is not complete until the consumer had the
opportunity to inspect the product and decide not to withdraw. This right is
augmented by the consumer’s power to reject non‐conforming goods for two years
past delivery.
B. Discussion
Ensuring informed consent or conscious choice is clearly valuable. But it is
unlikely that the techniques used by the CESL, and by many other consumer
protection laws, would have the desirable effect, and they might impose undesirable
costs. Under these rules, consumers will sign more forms, but will they read them?
Understand them? It is true that one additional form, one additional signature, one
additional click—all these are not too costly and will not slow down the wheels of
commerce. But such costless mechanical gestures are not very beneficial either. If
the CESL were true to its “conscious choice” rationale, it would require more
thorough and meaningful procedures that would guarantee more than an
appearance of choice. Those, however, would impose a significant transaction cost.
What about the right to withdraw? This right, like other consumer
protections, provides a real benefit. The ability to inspect the product and try it out
31
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CESL, Article 19, 24‐25
CESL, Articles 40, 42.
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for a period of time, before making a final commitment to purchase, is valuable,
especially if products are easily returnable. A right to withdraw may also be
valuable to the seller, if it increases demand for the seller’s products. Consumers
would be more likely to make remote purchases if they can return a product that
turns out to be less attractive than it initially appeared.33
But, alongside these benefits, a right to withdraw entails potentially large
costs, especially when it is abused by a subgroup of opportunistic consumers.
Returned items depreciate in value, sometime substantially. This cost will be born,
at least in part, by consumers, as sellers anticipate the likelihood of returns and
increase prices accordingly. The effect is similar to that of any other mandatory
quality feature.
Indeed, the main problem with the CESL’s right to withdraw rule is its
mandatory nature. In the absence of a mandatory duty, prime retailers routinely
offer a right to withdraw, while low‐end retailers do not. Even Walmart offers a 90‐
day free returns policy. A voluntarily designed right to withdraw thus enables
sellers to signal superior quality and reliability. A mandatory right to withdraw
destroys this selection effect.
In addition, a mandatory right to withdraw reduces sellers’ ability to offer
differentiated prices. Some consumers purchase extended return periods, while
other consumers waive the right to return the product altogether in exchange for a
lower price. (Think of the latter groups as passengers buying cheap nonrefundable

See Omri Ben‐Shahar and Eric Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J. Legal
Stud. 115 (2011); Horst Eidenmuller, Why Withdrawal Rights?, 7 European Rev. Contract
Law 1 (2011).
33
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airfares instead of the costlier, refundable fares.) For this group, the right to
purchase cheap products is valued more than the right to withdraw. The CESL’s
mandatory right to withdraw will force these consumers to pay for a feature that
they do not want.
We can think of at least two categories of consumers that might be hurt by
this mandate. First, the poorest consumers, who prefer to shop for low‐end products
at low‐end prices, will be deprived of some of their desired savings. It is a dubious
protection—in the name of “access justice”—to force the poor to spend money on
quality features that a paternalistic lawmaker selected for them, only to price some
of them out of the market. Second, consumers who are systematically less likely to
invoke the right to withdraw (perhaps because they are familiar with the product,
or are averse to reversals, or annoyed by the return effort), will have to pay for a
feature they are unlikely to enjoy, thereby cross‐subsidizing the heavier users of this
feature.
As with other mandatory provisions, a right to withdraw makes sense only if
it corrects a costly market failure. Such a market failure would occur, for example, if
consumers fail to appreciate the importance of a right to withdraw.34 These
imperfectly rational consumers would not demand a right to withdraw and sellers
would not offer it. Under these circumstances, the price differentiation and signaling
benefits of a voluntary right to withdraw would also go away. But is this really the
situation? Are consumers unmindful to sellers’ return policies? Are they stuck with
34 See Eidenmueller, supra note 33, who identifies the theoretical justifications for
withdrawal rights and concludes that they ought to be optional in the distance selling
context but mandatory in cases like doorstep sales that involve decision biases that are
either preexisting or heightened by sellers.
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products that they cannot return? The prevalence of voluntary return policies,
offered by many stores, chains, and e‐retailers, suggests that withdrawal rights are a
salient quality feature. There does not seem to be a market failure. And, accordingly,
regulatory intervention seems unnecessary and potentially disruptive.
IV. Supplementation and Interpretation
A. The Law
Contracts, including lengthy fine print consumer contracts, are necessarily
incomplete. Accordingly, supplementation (or gap‐filling) and interpretation are
necessary. To advance consumer protection, contract law may adopt pro‐consumer
default rules and a pro‐consumer interpretation approach. This, for example, is the
strategy one finds in the Uniform Commercial Code, with its buyer‐friendly default
rules relating to remedies, warranties, perfect tender, and even the parol evidence
rule.35
Because many pro‐consumer provisions in the CESL are mandatory, there is
a lesser role for default rules. Still, the CESL includes several pro‐consumer gap‐
fillers. Recognizing, however, that standard default rules are easily disclaimed by
sellers, the CESL makes them “sticky”—more difficult for drafters to unilaterally
alter. For example, the default rule of “no additional payments”—that is, no hidden
remuneration beyond the main contractual price—can be altered, but any
agreement to additional payments requires a separate express consent by the
consumer. A passive, unnoticed list of fees will not suffice.36 Likewise, the rules on
product conformity, which set high warranty standards, can be circumvented, but
35
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UCC, Articles 2‐715, 2‐314, 2‐601, 2‐202.
CESL, Article 71.
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their derogation “to the detriment of the consumer is valid only if, at the time of the
conclusion of the contract, the consumer knew of the specific condition of the goods
. . . ” Again, opt‐out is allowed only after the consumer expresses conscious,
informed consent.37
Contract terms are often ambiguous and require interpretation. When faced
with B2C contracts in various areas, most notably insurance, courts interpret
ambiguous terms contra proferentem. And the CESL follows suit: “Where there is
doubt about the meaning of a contract term in a contract between a trader and a
consumer, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail unless
the term was supplied by the consumer.”38
B. Discussion
In consumer contracts, pro‐consumer defaults have only limited effect
because sellers can easily replace them with standard form terms, at no cost and
without raising suspicion. Mindful of this problem, the law may impose special
consent requirements, but often such additional requirements only increase
transaction costs, without substantially alerting consumers or subduing greedy
sellers.
Consider the “no additional payments” default in the CESL, which stipulates
that sellers cannot charge an additional payment beyond the price remunerated as
the main contractual obligation.39 Opt‐out requires explicit consent to the additional
payment term, and cannot be accomplished by mere reference to the additional
37 CESL, Articles 99, 100. Contrast these opt‐out rule with the more lenient opt‐out rules for
business‐to‐business contracts in CESL, Article 104.
38 CESL, Article 64. See also Article 65.
39 CESL, Article 71.
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payments in the standard contract document. But how difficult would it be to obtain
such explicit, separate, consent? The consumer would simply need to sign her name
on yet another dotted line or a separate form (one more sheet added to the
paperwork packet). This type of “sticky” default is, in the end, just another
disclosure. Even if some basic disclosures are thought to be effective, they lose their
value as they pile up.
In choosing to enact sticky defaults, rather than mandatory rules, the law
intends to preserve some room for freedom of contract, while safeguarding against
mindless opt outs. It wants consumers to “know”, pay special attention to, a reversal
of the defaults. But in mass‐market transactions, there is a harsh tradeoff.
Mandating disclosures to inform consumers about opt outs is cheap but likely
ineffective. Sellers would figure out the disclosure templates that are legally
sufficient and easily direct their clients away from the pro‐consumer default rules.
Techniques that meaningfully raise consumers’ awareness, assuming such
techniques exists (can we force consumers to pay attention?), would dramatically
increase transactions costs increase.
Currently, most consumer sales law systems opt for the low‐transaction cost
version of the sticky default. This scenario, in which opt‐outs become just another
meaningless disclosure, is illustrated by the Uniform Commercial Code, which
provides a pro‐buyer warranty of merchantability along with generous remedies.
Like the more ambitious CESL, the UCC requires that opt outs be conspicuous.40 The
result: practically every consumer contract comes with boilerplate language
See UCC §§ 2‐314 & 2‐702 for the default rules on warranty and remedies; see UCC § 2‐
316 for the conspicuous disclaimer rule.
40
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disclaiming the default warranty. The ALLCAPS font of these terms, which American
law deems sufficient to render the disclosure conspicuous, is an artifact of this
regime. Just in case, though, merchants sometimes require a separate signature or
“click” to signify the buyer’s “meaningful” assent to a pro‐seller term.41 A pro‐
consumer default scheme is subsumed by the disclosure escape valve.
A mandate to interpret ambiguous terms in favor of consumers would force
sellers to write clearer, more explicit, longer form contracts. The cost to sellers of
such lengthy drafting is probably negligible. But since consumers do not read these
contracts anyway, the benefits will also be insignificant. This is not to argue that
contra proferentem is always undesirable. In insurance contracts, for example, the
ambiguous language can sometimes apply to the very essence of the policy. In such
contracts, there is no “product” other than the legal terms, and thus policyholders
have affirmative expectations over these terms. The pro‐consumer construction
protects these expectations.42 In most other consumer contracts the pro‐consumer
construction applies to the fine print, which is otherwise beyond the affirmative
expectation of most consumers. There, a legal policy that induces sellers to draft
these terms with hyper meticulous care might not generate any meaningful benefit.
V. Consumer Protection versus Harmonization
Our analysis of the four regulatory techniques used by European consumer
contract law suggests that they may be ineffective, and perhaps worse—inefficient

Cf. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 U. MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (discussing
opt outs of property rights); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529
(discussing opt outs of class action rights).
42 See C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
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and harmful to consumers. We now explore the implications of this assessment for
the ability of this body of law, and the CESL in particular, to achieve its other main
goal—the harmonization of member states’ contract law.
Law that is suboptimally designed can nonetheless become uniform. If the EU
were to impose a common statute on all sales transactions, then harmonization
would be achieved, regardless of whether the statute promotes efficiency or
protects consumers. But if the statute is—like the CESL—an optional law, we must
examine the incentives of sellers and buyers to choose it. Harmonization will be
achieved only if the statute is regularly chosen.
Assume initially that sellers and buyers will choose the CESL only if it
increases the contractual surplus, as compared to the alternative national law. In the
previous sections, we have identified substantial inefficiencies in the CESL. But we
have said nothing about the relative efficiency of the CESL as compared to national
laws. In principle, the CESL divides Europe into (1) states with sales laws that are
more efficient than the CESL, and (2) states with sales laws that are less efficient
than the CESL. Sellers and buyers will opt into the CESL if, absent such opt‐in, they
expect to be subject to the laws of a Group 2 state.43 If most states are in Group 2,
then the CESL should be able to achieve substantial harmonization and, at the same
time, increase the efficiency of many sales transactions. On the other hand, if most

The division into Group 1 and Group 2 states is overly simplistic. It could well be that the
sales laws of State A are superior to the CESL with respect to one category of transactions
but inferior to the CESL with respect to another category of transactions.
43
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states are in Group 1, then the effect of the CESL – both its harmonization effect and
its efficiency effect – will be limited.44
It is also possible that due to consumers’ ignorance and passivity, the choice
to opt into the CESL would reflect, not an increased total surplus from the
transaction, but rather increased profits to sellers. If sellers have unfettered control
of choice of law, and if consumers remain ignorant about this aspect of the
transaction, sellers will choose the CESL only if it benefits them, even when this
choice is overall welfare‐reducing. Many of the CESL provisions that we surveyed in
the previous sections are expected to reduce sellers' profits (for example: the no‐
cure rule, or the extended consumer right to reject goods.) Again, the CESL divides
Europe into two groups: (1) states with sales laws that are more pro‐seller than the
CESL, and (2) states with sales laws that are less pro‐seller than the CESL. Sellers
will only opt into the CESL if, absent such opt‐in, they expect to be subject to the
laws of a Group 2 state. If most states are in Group 2, then the CESL should be able to
achieve substantial harmonization. If most states are in Group 1, then the CESL will
have a limited harmonization effect.
This discussion suggests that the CESL can achieve harmonization only if the
laws of many member states are inferior from either the perspective of overall
efficiency or from the perspective of sellers, and even then harmonization will be
only partially accomplished. In an important way, the CESL’s two goals are at war
This “sorting” argument has to be qualified in two ways. First, as Eric Posner argues in
this Volume, it is costly to learn a new legal system. To reduce transactions costs of learning,
parties might simply stick with old habits. Second, as Ganuza and Gomez argue in the
Volume, it is costly for a seller to comply with differential state laws, and some sellers might
choose a uniform statute that is less efficient only to enjoy the benefits of a uniform
compliance standard.
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with each other. The CESL seeks to harmonize—namely, to make available “a self
standing uniform set of contract law rules,” but it is also ambitious with respect to
the content of such uniform rules—“to protect consumers.”45 The problem is that
the two goals are inconsistent. The more it pulls the second lever of consumer
protection, and sets it beyond the levels existing in most member states, the less
often the proposed law would be chosen and less uniformity would ensue. And vice
versa. Thus, as long as the consumer protection prong is either inefficient or profit
reducing to sellers, the tradeoff is inevitable. Harmonization can be achieved—and
may even justify mandatory metrics that simplify product comparison—but it
cannot at the same time institute redistributive policies through an opt‐in scheme.
This tradeoff seems inevitable, but it may also suggest an alternative strategy
for contract law harmonization. Imagine a statute that is minimally protective and
thus highly desirable to sellers. By enacting such an optional permissive instrument,
the EU could establish the infrastructure of harmonization, assuring that parties
choose and use the optional law, and priming sellers to grow accustomed to the
benefits of uniformity. Once this baseline is set—once the cross‐border uniform
legal network is substantial—consumer protection amendments could be gradually
added. It would be harder for reluctant sellers to leave the established legal network
than to refuse to join a budding network in the first place.
Conclusion
Many of the protections that European consumer contract law, and the CESL
in particular, confer upon consumers are of little or no value. The disclosure

45

Regulation, p. 4.
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requirements, the meaningful assent, and the pro‐consumer defaults rules—all
create the appearance of consumer protection without much substance. If anything,
they increase transactions costs. Other protections in the CESL are inefficient or
regressive. Some of the mandatory arrangements and the right to withdraw are
examples for protections that have actual effect on transactions, but a potentially
undesirable effect.
The CESL is an optional instrument. Sellers would resist choosing governing
law that reduces the value of the transaction, or which prices out some customers.
Accordingly, sellers will opt into the CESL only to avoid national law that is even
more restrictive and inefficient. This limited opt‐in translates into limited
harmonization. Two main goals of the CESL – consumer protection and
harmonization – are unlikely to be achieved.
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